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Available online xxxxTolerance is a distinguishing feature of Western culture. Still, it varies between and within
countries, as well as over time, and irrespective of whether one values it for its own sake or
for its beneﬁcial consequences, it becomes important to identify its determinants. In this
study, we investigate whether the character of economic policy plays a role, by looking at
the effect of changes in economic freedom (i.e., lower government expenditures, lower and
more general taxes and more modest regulation) on tolerance in one of the most market-
oriented countries, the United States. In comparing U.S. states, we ﬁnd that an increase in
the willingness to let atheists, homosexuals and communists speak, keep books in libraries
and teach college students is, overall, positively related to preceding increases in economic
freedom, more speciﬁcally in the form of more general taxes. We suggest, as one explanation,
that a discriminatory tax system, which is susceptible to the inﬂuence of special interests and
which treats people differently, gives rise to feelings of tension and conﬂict. In contrast, the
positive association for tolerance towards racists only applies to speech and books, not to
teaching, which may indicate that when it comes to educating the young, (in)tolerant attitudes
towards racists are more ﬁxed.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).JEL classiﬁcation:
P10
P48
Z13
Keywords:
Markets
Economic freedom
Tolerance
Taxation
Government
Generality
USA1. Introduction
Tolerance has increased over time in the United States (Twenge et al., 2015). The share of Americans who think that groups
like homosexuals, atheists, racists and communists should have a right to have their say, even if one does not approve of their
message, has gone up from about 50–60% to 60–80% over the past four decades – with the largest change for tolerance towards
homosexuals and with the smallest change for tolerance towards racists.1 What can explain such changes? This study aims at of-
fering an explanation, with a particular and, in the American context, novel focus on the role of government vs. markets. The
question we ask is whether a freer economy, i.e., an economy that has experienced a limitation of government expenditures,
lower and more general taxation or more modest regulation, contributes to more or less tolerance.strial Economics (IFN), Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden.
n), therese.nilsson@nek.lu.se (T. Nilsson).
eWesternworld in the context of religious conﬂict in order to reduce conﬂict (Locke, 1689; Forst, 2012). Itwas
periments in living. Still, it has indeed been the case, also in theWest, that intolerance towards various groups
shows this to be the case in the American colonies.
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changes in economic freedom to subsequent medium-term changes in tolerance. The variables we use are the index Economic
Freedom of North America (EF) in Ashby et al. (2011), which measures the size of government, the tax burden and the degree
of (labor-market) regulation in each state, and tolerance measures from the General Social Survey (2014) covering attitudes to-
wards four minorities: racists, atheists, communists and homosexuals. There is an important conceptual difference between
such attitudes (capturing tolerance/intolerance) and formal institutions (capturing non-discrimination/discrimination). While peo-
ple may think that our four minorities should be legally constrained in what they do to spread their message, it is by no means
certain that such constraints are in fact in place. We study what determines the attitudes, not what determines what the law stip-
ulates (even though one can very well imagine a link between the two – e.g., if people in general are intolerant, this could make
legislators more prone to introduce discriminatory rules).2
To get an idea of the distribution and change in tolerance (the average value of the four types of tolerance) in the U.S. states,
see Fig. 1a for 1982 and Fig. 1b for 2008, where darker colors and higher numbers indicate more tolerance.
To give some examples from 2008, Arkansas and Louisiana appear to be the least tolerant states overall, while Minnesota and
Arizona appear to be the most tolerant. Looking at the change in overall tolerance since 1982, Oregon and Kansas have seen the
largest decreases, while Kentucky and Minnesota have gone in the opposite direction and seen increased tolerance to a greater
extent than other states. Clearly, there are differences in tolerance across states and within states over time. For a more ﬁne-
grained illustration of the development of tolerance (of different kinds) in the states in our sample, see Fig. OA1 in the Online
appendix.
The results from our empirical analysis indicate that more economic freedom relates positively to more tolerance towards
three groups: atheists, communists and homosexuals (but not, to the same extent, to tolerance towards racists). The more
market-oriented a state's economic policy becomes, in terms of increasing the general character taxes through less progressivity,
the more willing people are to let these minorities into public discourse. We interpret this as an indication that changes in the
character of the tax system can inﬂuence popular sentiments: By taxing some people's income at a higher rate than that of others,
state governments introduce tension and conﬂict (Buchanan and Congleton, 1998), with negative results for tolerance towards
minority groups. The other parts of economic freedom do not turn out to be robustly related to changes in tolerance, although
there is some indication that the change in the level of taxes in a state may also matter. A number of sensitivity tests conﬁrm
the results and interpretation we offer.
Why take an interest in tolerance? One may value tolerance for its own sake, but it can also be linked to various outcomes that
people in turn value. For example, modern research underscores the importance of tolerance for the subjective well-being of peo-
ple (Inglehart et al., 2013). It may also be, as argued by Corneo and Jeanne (2009), that the chances for smaller groups that differ
from the majority in a society to enjoy a substantial degree of legal protection increase with tolerance. Moreover, tolerance has
been shown to entail economic consequences. Florida (2014, p. 200) argues that this generous attitude towards others creates
a more dynamic economy:2 Gut
ever, it i
(2015).
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(2010).
Pleas
giouThemore tolerant a place is, themore welcoming it is to all kinds of people, and themore likely it is to attract the kinds of peo-
ple who are oriented towards self-expression and openness to experience –which psychological studies show are key charac-
teristics of entrepreneurial behavior.In a study of U.S. regions, Florida et al. (2008) ﬁnd that tolerance, as measured by their Gay-Bohemian index (i.e., the concen-
tration of homosexual households and people working in the arts, design and similar occupations) is positively related both to
human capital and the share of people who belong to “the creative class”, and also to both regional wages and income.3 Cross-
country analysis likewise suggests that tolerance is associated with economic growth: Berggren and Elinder (2012a,b) ﬁnd that
a higher share of people who do not mind having homosexual neighbors relates negatively to growth and that a higher share
of people who do not mind having people of a different race as neighbors relates positively to growth in certain circumstances.
Turning to determinants of tolerance, the only existing study that we are aware of linking economic freedom to tolerance is a
cross-country study, Berggren and Nilsson (2013). Their examination of the relationship indicates that it is positive, with tolerance
being measured as attitudes to neighbors that are homosexual or of a different race and as a willingness to teach kids tolerance.
The biggest effect is for tolerance towards homosexuals. The advantage with our study is that it is conducted with within-country
data, which means that we automatically hold constant central institutions and cultural features that differ between countries and
which can confound the ﬁndings. Interestingly, the two areas that were found to matter the most for tolerance across countries
were a high-quality legal system and monetary stability – and by looking at the U.S. states, with a relatively uniﬁed legal system
and a single monetary policy, we are better able to isolate the role free markets play for the prevalence of tolerant attitudes (over
and above these national institutions and policies). As indicated above, we do ﬁnd a positive effect of more general taxation,
which suggests that even when legal quality and monetary stability are high, there is scope for policy measures to affect tolerance.
Other studies of “macro”-determinants of tolerance are few. They include Corneo and Jeanne (2009), who ﬁnd that GDP per
capita and becoming a new EU member affect tolerance towards homosexuals positively. Andersen and Fetner (2008) ﬁnd amann and Voigt (2015) develop a new indicator of the rule of law and clarify, in so doing, how the rule of law implies generality and non-discrimination. How-
s not always the case, not even in democracy, that the rule of law in this sense is established, for political-economy reasons developed by Mukand and Rodrik
examples of related studies that reach similar conclusions, see, e.g., McGranahan and Wojan (2007); Boschma and Fritsch (2009) and Florida and Mellander
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Fig. 1. a Tolerance in U.S. states 1982. b. Tolerance in U.S. states 2008. Note: The maps illustrate tolerance in the 35 U.S. states for which data are available for both
1982 and 2008 in the General Social Survey (2014), with darker colors and higher numbers indicating more tolerance.
3N. Berggren, T. Nilsson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxnegative effect of income inequality but a positive impact from income on the same type of attitude. Spitz (2004), lastly, posits a
connection between the free-trade agreement NAFTA and greater acceptance for same-sex marriage in the United States, as a con-
sequence of greater interaction and integration with more tolerant Canadians. Note that all these studies look at popular attitudes
to minorities, not at discrimination in formal institutions, which is a separate matter.
There are other less close, but still related, studies. The Economic Freedom of the World index, or some of its areas, have been
found to be related to “social” or cultural variables other than tolerance in cross-country studies: Berggren and Jordahl (2006) ﬁnd
that economic freedom increases social trust, and Rode (2013) documents a positive effect on subjective well-being.4 The4 For a comprehensive summary of studies using this index, see Hall and Lawson (2014).
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ruption and income inequality in the context of U.S. states. Apergis et al. (2012) conclude that economic freedom decreases corrup-
tion in the long run, but also note that the relationship seems to be bidirectional. Ashby and Sobel (2008) identify a negative effect of
economic freedom on income inequality, which Apergis et al. (2014) also do for the long-term equilibrium case (while also ﬁnding
signs of a bicausal relationship). Bennett and Vedder (2013) rather ﬁnd an inverted u-shape between the two variables, with a neg-
ative relationship only above a certain level of economic freedom. Hoover et al. (2015) apply a novel perspective and focus on racial
income differences. The results suggest that economic freedom increases the income ratio between ethnic groups.
We now turn to theoretical considerations (Section 2), before continuing with a presentation of our empirical strategy and
data (Section 3) and the empirical results (Section 4), ﬁnally offering some concluding remarks (Section 5).2. Theoretical considerations
Tolerance is a social attitude of openness, even to opinions, characteristics and behavior that one dislikes. Theoretically, we see two
main links connecting economic freedom and tolerance: one relating to government activities and one relating to market activities.2.1. Government activities
Governments decide on central issues of concern for how people behave and think through taxation, expenditures and
regulation.
Regarding taxation, we suggest that both its character and level can play a role. The character of taxation can have a direct
effect on tolerance. As outlined by Buchanan and Congleton (1998), much policymaking, not least taxation, is characterized by
non-generality, by people being treated differently. For example, some pay a higher tax-rate on their incomes than others; income
and capital owners are taxed differently; and certain sectors face lower sales-tax or VAT rates than others, etc. There might, of
course, be good efﬁciency or equity arguments for such unequal treatment, but they can nevertheless be perceived as favoring
some at the expense of others, especially if they stem from special-interest capture, and this can create tension among people
and a reduced willingness to tolerate views one dislikes. The level of taxation can be expected to affect tolerance by deciding
how available resources are divided between the private and public sectors – and if government activities tend to decrease toler-
ance and private activities to increase it, this implies that less taxation brings about more tolerance (or vice versa).
Regarding expenditures, they could also affect tolerance through their character and level. As for their character, some types of
expenditures can be expected to increase tolerance, maybe especially education, which can foster an open attitude towards others
through teaching and social interaction, and certain social expenditures that reduce inequality. In some cases, the government also
uses its resources for propaganda in the direction of tolerance, which might pay off. However, if expenditures are perceived to be
distributed in a way that beneﬁts some at the expense of others, this can cause feelings of conﬂict to arise. Again, if special inter-
ests manage to secure beneﬁts to which they are not thought to be entitled, this can lead to a dislike of minority groups in society
and reduce the willingness to understand others. As for the level, we have a scaling effect here as well: If more of the budget is
allocated to measures that increase tolerance, tolerance increases even more, and vice versa.
Regarding regulation, it can matter in two ways as well: through its character and through its level. If the character of regula-
tion is such as to remove barriers to entry and to increase competition, or if it is perceived as “taming” market forces that could
otherwise be exploitative or opportunistic, it can contribute to markets working in a way that beneﬁt people in general – which,
for reasons mentioned below, can be expected to increase tolerance. However, if regulation is based, not on common-interest con-
siderations but on special-interest concerns, it can favor certain companies at the expense of others and be thought to introduce
unfair rules of the game, with discontent and tension as a result from those who were not favored.
Lastly, can these effects be related to the particular groups under study, i.e., racists, homosexuals, atheists and communists? It is
straightforward to see a direct link if such a group is favored exclusively at the expense of others – say, if atheists get a favorable
tax treatment or subsidies. But since taxation, expenditures and regulation are not typically differentiated along such precise group
lines, we argue that non-general policy in these areas need not be directed towards these particular groups in order for it to affect
tolerance towards them.
First, a perception of more unfairness in government policy can create a general sensation of suspicion and distrust between
people and groups, and vice versa, if the perceived unfairness is reduced – especially if the government is seen as acting to satisfy
explicit demands for more favors by special interests. In that sense, government policy in one area functions as a symbol and a
signal of the government's willingness to treat people differently overall. It can also plausibly be argued that non-generality in
one area is related to non-generality in other areas in actual policy: Either the government operates under a “rule of law” concep-
tion of politics (as advocated by Buchanan and Congleton, 1998; cf. Gutmann and Voigt, 2015), or it does not consider itself bound
by such a conception. Alas, we do not have data on the generality of different kinds of policy, but in principle this could be inves-
tigated empirically.5 Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) formulate a similar idea in the context of welfare policy and social trust: How
government ofﬁcials (are perceived to) treat people generalizes into social attitudes. If the policy and its implementation are uni-
versal, it leads to more trust between people; if it is non-general and means-tested, it tends to work in the other direction.5 One can point, for some support, at research showing that prejudicial attitudes often seem related, such that if they are inﬂuenced to change in relation to one group,
they tend to be change in relation to other groups as well (Bierly, 1985; Pettigrew, 1997; Aosved et al., 2009).
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less evasion (Richardson, 2006), since the system is easier to understand, easier to control and possibly perceived as more legit-
imate. When fewer people cheat, this can generate less adverse feelings towards others, and more tolerance among people. Third,
more progressive rates imply that work becomes less proﬁtable at the margin for certain income groups, which implies that a
larger fraction stays at home more. Both because of less net income and more time at home, this arguably entails a reduced de-
mand for home services, with a concomitant reduced opportunity for people of different socioeconomic (and plausibly also racial
and political) characteristics to meet and inﬂuence each other's attitudes. In all, we believe there are good theoretical reasons to
expect tolerance towards various minority groups to increase if economic policy, not least tax policy, becomes less discriminatory.
2.2. Market activities
Our empirical analysis uses a measure that characterizes economic policy in terms of how market-oriented it is. As outlined in
the preceding section, government policy as such could inﬂuence tolerance; but it also determines what share of the economy
that is left for the private sphere through the levels of taxation and expenditure. And if market activities are related to tolerance,
the degree to which economic policy leaves room for the market to function could then also affect tolerance.
There is a long, not least Marxist tradition of telling a pessimistic story about markets. Some elements of this story, such as
markets giving rise to exploitation, economic inequality and selﬁshness (Hirschman, 1982; Casebeer, 2008) can be related to so-
cial attitudes like tolerance. If workers experience maltreatment and unfavorable conditions (maybe even unemployment), this can
create hostility towards “capitalists” and possibly towards society at large. Inequality has been linked to low social trust (Jordahl,
2009) – economic differences tend to create a feeling of distance and, sometimes, unfairness – and since it seems as if markets'
ability to generate tolerance is increasing in social trust (Berggren and Nilsson, 2014), this might have a dampening effect on the
presence of tolerance. Selﬁshness implies, by deﬁnition, that one cares for oneself and not for others, which might entail not caring
for the right of others to say what they want. At the very least, this could mean weaker support for tolerance. Experimental ev-
idence suggests that monetary incentives (typical of markets) at times crowd out altruistic sentiments and that the “minimalist”
character of markets shapes norms and behavior: One can (learn to) interact with others in a shallow manner without deeper
bonds, and mechanisms to ensure “nice” behavior, such as retaliation and reputation, may not work well (Bowles, 1998). A
less altruistic orientation could mean a lesser concern for the rights of others to have their say in society; and experience of
“not-so-nice” behavior can induce people to generalize that others different from oneself, and about whom one knows little,
are prone to try to hurt one, which can also reduce tolerance for differences.
However, there are other theories of a more optimistic kind that stress the ability of markets to bring about virtuous behavior
and, not least, social attitudes like tolerance. Paine (1792/1951, p. 215) was an early proponent of such a view:Pleas
giou(Commerce) is a paciﬁc system, operating to cordialise mankind, by rendering Nations, as well as individuals, useful to each
other. … The invention of commerce … is the greatest approach towards universal civilization that has yet been made by
any means not immediately ﬂowing from moral principles.That is, people enter into voluntary and peaceful arrangements with others in order to exchange resources, as they realize that
this is mutually beneﬁcial, and this not only reﬂects but also sustains a culture of cooperation. As Casebeer (2008) notes, such
environments afford opportunities for virtues to develop through practice in the form of repeated interactions with others. And
positive experiences of dealing with others could increase tolerance: Those who are different are not seen as threatening but
able to co-exist with and also contribute to higher well-being for you. This idea reﬂects the so-called contact hypothesis
(Allport, 1954), which states that intergroup prejudice is reduced when members of different groups interact with each other
under certain conditions (equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, support of authorities, law or customs, and person-
al interaction). The hypothesis is found to hold in many empirical studies, even when these conditions do not hold (but more so if
they do) – see, e.g., Pettigrew et al. (2011) for a review and Carrell et al. (2015).
Relating this more directly to markets, there is, indeed, empirical support for market integration being able to shape social at-
titudes in a pro-social way. Henrich et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the higher the degree of market integration, the greater the likelihood
of cooperation and making fair offers to strangers. Henrich et al. (2010) similarly show experimentally how engagement in
markets sustains fairness in exchange. Huck et al. (2012) report experimental results that an ability to build a reputation, coupled
with competitiveness (the ability to choose with whom to interact), is conducive to trust (which in turn, as noted, is conducive to
tolerance). Hoffman and Morgan (2015) ﬁnd that workers in industries with “cutthroat” competition in fact are more pro-social –
in the sense of exhibiting more altruism, trust, trustworthiness and honesty – than student subjects. They theorize that in
industries with anonymity, high stakes and competitiveness, it is difﬁcult to solve the trust problem with formal mechanisms,
so individuals must rely on a variety of informal mechanisms. Pro-social individuals can more easily sustain trust, and hence pros-
per, in these situations. Bartling et al. (2015) ﬁnd evidence from Switzerland that many consumers and ﬁrms wish to avoid a neg-
ative social impact in the market. This behavior is generally robust to varying market characteristics, such as increased seller
competition and limited consumer information.
It bears noting that what is meant by “market activities” varies quite a bit. On the one hand, one may have in mind the stylized
idea of markets from microeconomic textbooks with perfect competition, where transactions are of a fast, one-shot nature, where
anonymity reigns between economic actors and where entry and exit is costless. On the other hand, one may think of thick, deep
personalized settings, characterized by repeated dealings with different kinds of people, some of whom one knows well, some ofe cite this article as: Berggren, N., Nilsson, T., Tolerance in the United States: Does economic freedom transform racial, reli-
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to develop and deepen relations with others.6 Given the opposing predictions discussed above, it is important to clarify that the
effects of markets on tolerance need not be the same for both of these cases. Bowles (1998) argues that the former type of setting
can give rise to and sustain behavior that is not socially pleasing. We grant that this is a possibility, but on the one hand, the risk
for this should be smaller in the second type of setting, and on the other hand, even in an idealized competitive economy of anon-
ymous, ephemeral and costless transactions, two aspects of market interaction may nevertheless stimulate tolerance (broadly in
line with the experimental results reported above).
First, selﬁshness was identiﬁed above as a possible consequence of market interaction, the idea being that ephemeral interac-
tion based on shallow relations and a concern for bettering one's own condition, ﬁrst and foremost, reinforces a tendency to not
care about others. However, it is not clear that this reduces tolerance. Tolerance need not be based on a genuine concern for
others: in fact, the classical meaning of the term indicates that it is not. It is an attitude of non-interference, which may lie
very close to simply not caring for others (one way or the other). If I do not care, I do not want to stop others from having
their say. Hence, if markets give rise to selﬁshness (which in itself is not clear), this can arguably go hand in hand with tolerance.
Second, markets of the perfect-competition etc. kind are characterized by freedom and strict individualism or atomism. The agent
sees that such an abstract, free system works in an ordered manner (given the rule of law) and that it brings beneﬁts to those
who operate in it. Through generalization, agents may very well think that “the market of ideas” can work in a similar way
and give rise to positive consequences: People of different persuasions and kinds come together and have their say, and this
could give rise to more correct knowledge and better understanding of why we think what we think (cf. Mill, 1859). If freedom
works in one situation, it may very well be taken to hold in another.7 And if economic agents, perhaps when they were in busi-
ness school, read Coase, 1974, such a perceived link between markets for goods and services, on the one hand, and markets for
ideas, on the other, is even more probable.
Two further reasons for a positive link between the degree to which an economy is market-oriented and tolerance can be prof-
fered. First, the proﬁt motive can induce people in competitive sectors to tolerate those who are different. Even though “deep”,
personal tolerance may be lacking, a manager or company owner realizes that if he rejects people on the basis of characteristics
or views that are not related to productivity, competing ﬁrms gain a competitive advantage, which may in the end lead to the
demise of the company. This relates to the theory of discrimination introduced by Becker (1971), who points at a mechanism
in markets for reducing the exclusion from the economy of people on other bases than low productivity, which will tend to dis-
courage discrimination. In a free market economy, with competing, proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms and people set on maximizing their well-
being, economic actors will therefore tend to have an incentive to be tolerant. Likewise, consumers would suffer utility losses if
they were to reject better offers of goods and services solely because the companies making the offers were represented by peo-
ple of a certain race, creed, sexual orientation or the like. Second, if people are less dependent on government, they will feel it
particularly important to equip their children for life in a market economy, which builds on meeting approval from others. For
reasons outlined by, e.g., Corneo and Jeanne (2009) and as indicated by empirical analyses in Berggren and Nilsson (2013,
2015), instilling tolerance may be seen as an insurance mechanism when it is uncertain who turns out to belong to what minor-
ity. A tolerant culture entails openness to those who grow up, even if they deviate from the mainstream.
2.3. Summary
To summarize, on theoretical grounds it is clear that one can expect economic freedom to affect tolerance: What government
does and how it does it, as well as the scope for voluntary, commercial exchange through which people meet and form attitudes
towards others who are different, should contribute to forming attitudes towards others. But the ways in which economic free-
dom works in this area are potentially manifold and go in different directions, which justiﬁes an empirical analysis to shed
light on what the net effect is.
3. Empirical strategy and data
3.1. Empirical strategy
In order to test whether and in what way economic freedom relates to tolerance, we specify an empirical model of the follow-
ing kind:6 As a
7 Bow
come ge
come pa
Pleas
giouΔToleranceij ¼ α þ β1 ΔEFkj
 
þ β2 X j
 
þ ε j ð1Þwhere ΔToleranceij denotes the change in tolerance i (where i = racists, atheists, homosexuals, average) in state j between period
t and t + 6, ΔEFkjdenotes the change in economic freedom k (where k = size of government, takings and discriminatory taxation,rgued by Klein (1997, 2000), in this type of setting reputation and assurancemechanisms are both demanded and supplied in order to ensure “nice” behavior.
les (1998, p. 80): “However acquired, preferences are internalized: there is considerable evidence that preferences learned under one set of circumstances be-
neralized reasons for behavior. Thus economic institutions may induce speciﬁc behaviors – self-regarding, opportunistic, or cooperative, say –which then be-
rt of the behavioral repertoire of the individual.”
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7N. Berggren, T. Nilsson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxregulation, average) in state j during a preceding period, between t and t − 6, and where Xj denotes the levels of the control var-
iables at t in state j.
The analysis is carried out on the state level in the United States for 41 states using data over the period 1982–2008, where
t = 1988, 1994, 2002.8 Fig. 2 illustrates the timing of the variables. To exemplify, let t = 2002. The change in tolerance is calcu-
lated using General Social Survey data in 2002 and in 2008, while the change in economic freedom is calculated using information
in 1996 and in 2002. All additional control variables have values from 2002.
The use of changes rather than levels is an attempt to handle unobserved heterogeneity. If using levels, a convincing analysis
of the relation between economic freedom and tolerance requires a large number of control variables to account for state hetero-
geneity. The number of such variables available is, however, limited, and a large set of controls is also problematic to incorporate
when having a small sample of observations, as in our case. We therefore opt for a ﬁrst-difference analysis and look at the rela-
tionship between changes in economic freedom and changes in tolerance. This enables us to estimate the relationship in a manner
that is robust to latent heterogeneity due to time-invariant effects. Using changes, over fairly long time periods, also reﬂects our
view that an inﬂuence of economic freedom on cultural variables, such as tolerance, is the result of medium-term processes. For
policy changes to have an effect, they need to be in place over some period of time such that people adapt their thinking and
behavior and have time to be affected by new experiences. Lastly, it bears noting that by having the change in economic freedom
predate the change in tolerance, we also reduce the risk that our results capture an inﬂuence from tolerance on economic
freedom.3.2. Data
Our outcome variables measure changes in tolerance. There are ﬁve of them altogether, based on nine survey questions in the
General Social Survey:
• Tolerance racists: The average of the change (in percentage points) in these three shares in each included U.S. state:
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “Consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior. If such a
person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not?”.
o The share that replies “Not remove” to the question “If some people in your community suggested a book he wrote which said
that Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?”.
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “Should a racist be allowed to” and “Should a racist be allowed to teach in a
college or university, or not?”.
• Tolerance homosexuals: The average of the change (in percentage points) in these three shares in each included U.S. state:
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “What about a man who admits that he is a homosexual. Suppose this admit-
ted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?”.
o The share that replies “Not remove” to the question “If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in
favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?”.
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “Should a homosexual be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?”.
• Tolerance atheists: The average of the change (in percentage points) in these three shares in each included U.S. state:
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous
by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion. If such a person wanted to make a speech in
your (city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?”.
o The share that replies “Not remove” to the question “If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote
against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?”.
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous
by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion. Should such a person be allowed to teach in
a college or university, or not?”.
• Tolerance communists: The average of the change (in percentage points) in these three shares in each included U.S. state:
o The share that replies “Allowed” to the question “Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is
a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak,
or not?”.
o The share that replies “Not remove” to the question “Suppose he [a communist] wrote a book which is in your public library.
Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or
not?”.
o The share that replies “Not ﬁred” to the question “Suppose a communist is teaching in a college. Should he be ﬁred, or not?”.
• Tolerance: The average of Tolerance racists, Tolerance homosexuals, Tolerance atheists and Tolerance communists.8 Our empirical strategy to examine medium-term changes in tolerance is more data-demanding than a traditional cross-sectional analysis. In the General
Social Survey, there is information containing at least two data points that are six years apart for 41 states (listed in Table A1 in the Appendix). Due to data availability
we use t=1994 rather than t= 1995. The change in economic freedom is still predating the change in tolerance in the samemanner as described above. An alternative
for the last time period would be to stop at the year 2000, to get even time periods, but we then lose a number of observations, and we therefore prefer to end the last
period in 2002.
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8 N. Berggren, T. Nilsson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxThese tolerance measures are chosen since they are clean, in the sense that the answers reveal a person's attitude towards the
minority in question without introducing other considerations; since they conform to classical situations of tolerance, where the
right of minorities to express their views is concerned; since there is reasonable variation in the data.9,10 To comment brieﬂy on
each measure, tolerance towards homosexuals is interesting in itself, given the persecuted history of this minority, but Inglehart
and Abramson (1999) furthermore regard it as a general indicator of tolerance in a society; cf. Florida (2014, p. 198). As for athe-
ists, they have become more vocal in recent years and have challenged widely held religious beliefs in the United States. How
they are perceived by most people seems important as such in this cultural development dynamic; but Wiseman and Young
(2014) also ﬁnd a link, across U.S. states, between the share of non-believers and productive entrepreneurship, suggesting a po-
tential link between tolerance towards atheists and economic growth. Tolerance towards communists is the only political variable
we can include, and as such we consider it interesting to see if it is affected by political decisions in the economic area – especially
if market-oriented policies are related to an ideology that regards markets as suspect. Lastly, it might be thought that tolerance
towards racists is different in character from tolerance towards the other groups: in the former case, those tolerated are charac-
terized by intolerance. While there is something to this, we would not like to overstate this aspect of racism in relation to the
other three phenomena under study – e.g., one might consider communists intolerant towards the capitalists and (at least
some) atheists intolerant towards the religious. What it boils down to, as we see it, is that tolerance entails an attitude of allowing
those thought to hold unpleasant – including intolerant – views to have their say, so we think it apt to study this variable as
well.11
Our main explanatory variables are the changes in four measures of economic freedom, measured for each of the included U.S.
states by Ashby et al. (2011): Size of government (EF1), Takings and discriminatory taxation (EF2), Regulation (EF3) and Economic
Freedom (EF), the last measure being the average of EF1, EF2 and EF3. Each of the three areas of EF in turn consists of several
variables, which we also relate to tolerance, in order to get a more detailed understanding of what drives the EF–tolerance rela-
tionship. The precise construction of these measures is described in Table A2 in the Appendix. They capture different aspects of
the degree to which government and market activities respectively characterize an economy. The less the government intervenes
in the economy, and the more it does so in a non-discriminatory fashion, the more economic freedom.12
A ﬁrst-difference analysis bundles time-invariant state characteristics into an error component and estimates the relationship
between changes in economic freedom and changes in tolerance in a way that is robust to unobserved heterogeneity with respect
to factors that are constant over time at the state level. However, since some matters vary over time, we make use of a set of
control variables, chosen both because they have been shown to matter in previous studies on the determinants of tolerance
and because we consider them potentially important on theoretical grounds. In our main speciﬁcations, we include the values
at time t of: tolerance (we include this initial value to capture convergence effects), real GDP per capita, education levels
(more speciﬁcally, the share with less than high school education as the reference group, the share of high school graduates,
the share of those with some college and the share of those with a college degree), the age structure (more speciﬁcally, the
share of the population younger than 25 as the reference group, the share aged 25–44, the share aged 45–64 and the share
older than 64), the shares of blacks and Hispanics and the Gini coefﬁcient (to measure income inequality). We use initial levels9 Thesemeasures do not necessarily only capture tolerant attitudes in the classical sense, where someone iswilling to let something he or she dislikes be allowed, but
also truly supportive attitudes. We consider this broader, “neoclassical” deﬁnition of tolerance (Von Bergen and Bandow, 2009) apt for our purposes. The most impor-
tant thing for theminorities in question is arguablywhether or not they are let into society, notwhy they are. And so thesemeasures express the degree towhich people
in each state are willing to let these three minorities have an equal say, for whatever reason.
10 In a similar way the General Social Survey includes information on attitudes towards socialists, revolutionaries and militarists, but data for these measures are not
available for the years used in our study, and we therefore leave them out of our analysis.
11 Admittedly, as arguedby Popper (1945), there is a line atwhich the tolerant, from the point of viewof their values, should cease to be tolerant towards intolerance –
when the latter threatens key values of the overall tolerant society. Whether tolerance towards racists is such an unacceptable type of tolerance is not for us as social
scientists to say. Our focus is on whether this type of tolerance is related to economic freedom – and it actually turns out to be different from the other measures in this
regard, as reported in the next section.
12 We use the “all-government” version of the index, which captures the impact of policy on economic freedom by all three levels of government (federal, state and
municipal) in each state.We consider this adequate sincewe are interested in the effects of (changes in) economic freedom irrespective of the level atwhich thepolicies
were decided. However, note that certain areas of policy that are typically decided upon at the federal level and which arguably apply equally to all states, such as the
rule of law,monetary policy and trade policy, are not part of the index (as constructed in 2011 and backwards). See Karagegovic et al. (2003) for an earlier version of the
index.
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erance, and by including them, time-wise, in between changes in the main explanatory variable of interest and changes in toler-
ance, we think we better capture the “real” effect of the former. We also include dummy variables for geographical regions within
the United States (Alaska as the reference group, the Midwest, the North, the South and the West). Table A3 in the Appendix pre-
sents all variables, their sources and descriptive statistics.13
4. Results
4.1. Main results
We ﬁrst present the results of our main speciﬁcation in Table 1. We begin with a parsimonious baseline speciﬁcation and grad-
ually increase the number of controls to identify the effects of changes in the model. Table 1 presents the baseline results focusing
on changes in average economic freedom, with changes in average tolerance as the dependent variable.
The results indicate that more economic freedom in a preceding period correlates positively with increases in overall tolerance.
Statistical signiﬁcance obtains when the number of control variables is increased. The results (from column 6) indicate that a one-
unit change in economic freedom on average corresponds to a six-percentage point change in tolerance. To get a feeling for these
magnitudes we can give an illustrative example focusing on Tennessee and Texas. These two states had the very same level of
tolerance (0.51) in 1982, but took somewhat different paths regarding economic freedom in the following decades. If Texas
had increased its overall EF score to the same extent as Tennessee over the time period (1.1 for Tennessee compared to 0.4 for
Texas), this would have resulted in a further eight-percent increase of tolerance.14
Looking at the control variables, a higher level of tolerance in a state comes with a smaller change in tolerance over each six-
year period. Education is an important predictor of the development of tolerance, but there is a weak link between demographic
structure and changes in tolerance. In some speciﬁcations the oldest age group is associated with a greater increase in tolerance
than the youngest. This is in line with indications in other studies that ﬁnd that older people in the United States have been af-
fected more strongly in a tolerant direction than others, even though as a rule the young are still more tolerant (Andersen and
Fetner, 2008; Twenge et al., 2015). Notably, neither ethnicity, GDP per capita (except in the ﬁrst column) nor income inequality
seems to matter in a statistically signiﬁcant way; the same goes for the regions.
Table 2 presents the baseline results when examining each tolerance measure separately (without results for the control var-
iables; they are, however, reported in Table OA1 in the Online appendix). Interestingly, the ﬁndings suggest varying effects from
changes in government involvement in economic life on changes in tolerance. While increases in tolerance towards homosexuals,
communists and atheists are positively related to preceding increases in economic freedom, there is no such statistically signiﬁ-
cant relationship for tolerance towards racists. The latter type of tolerance thus seems unaffected by the size and character of gov-
ernment activities and by the scope of market activities.
What could explain this? When we decompose tolerance towards racists, we ﬁnd that increases in two of the three types of
tolerance – relating to giving a speech and keeping a book in the library – are positively related to previous increases in economic
freedom. It is the absence of an increase in tolerance towards racists teaching college students, as a result of more economic free-
dom, that drives the “zero” estimate in Table 2. We speculate that racism is considered an especially intolerable phenomenon in
the context of education and that most people's positions are therefore not affected by either changes in economic freedom or the
related changes in the scope of market activities.15 Still, the overall results suggest a great potential for more economic freedom to
increase tolerance towards certain minorities.
In order to make more precise what elements of economic freedom that contribute to increased tolerance in U.S. states and get
a deeper understanding of baseline ﬁndings, we also estimate the same model as before, except we replace the average measure
of change in economic freedom with the change in the three areas EF1, EF2 and EF3. Table 3 presents the estimated coefﬁcients,
without reporting, for reasons of space, the ﬁndings for the control variables. The results suggest that the area of importance con-
cerns taxation (change in EF2), which positively and signiﬁcantly relates to increased tolerance towards homosexuals, atheists and
communists (and in one speciﬁcation also racists) in the subsequent time period. The other two areas of economic freedom do
not seem to matter for tolerance.
When replacing the change in EF2 with the changes in its four constituent variables (see Table A2), the change in the tax share
of GDP (EF2a) and the change in the top marginal tax rate and the income threshold at which it applies (EF2b) are related to
increased tolerance. The latter dimension of taxation is clearly more robust – it is the only one that matters when including all
the changes in the four EF2 variables in the same speciﬁcation. See Table 4 for the results. This implies that what drives the re-
lationship between changes in economic freedom and changes in tolerance is, in fact, the degree to which the income-tax systems13 Some of the controls, inequality and real GDP per capita in particular, may bemediators, i.e., factors that are inﬂuenced by changes in economic freedom. Including a
mediator in the speciﬁcation reduces the estimated effect of changes in economic freedom on changes in tolerance, which implies that we get conservative estimates.
14 (0.51 + (1.1*0.6))-(0.51 + (0.4*0.6)) = 0.576–0.534 = 0.042, 0.042/0.53.4 = 0.079.
15 Could it be that the results for tolerance towards racists are somewhat different because many people are themselves racist? Although this is hard to investigate
with aggregate data, when we correlate our tolerance-towards-racists measure with two measures of racism (the share in a state that say that they would not vote
for a black presidential candidate, even if competent and nominated by their own party; and the share that agrees that blacks should not push themselves where they
are notwanted), we not onlyﬁnd relatively low coefﬁcients, both for levels (−0.23;−0.42) and changes (−0.11;−0.41) – but they are also of the “wrong” sign:More
tolerance towards racists goes with fewer racists. Hence, we do not ﬁnd support for such an explanation.
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Table 1
Economic freedom and tolerance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
ΔEF 0.019 0.037** 0.045** 0.046** 0.051** 0.056***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Tolerance −0.585*** −0.804*** −0.887*** −0.896*** −0.897*** −0.930***
(0.103) (0.105) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) (0.111)
Real GDP per capita 0.104** −0.039 0.096 0.083 0.082 −0.021
(0.048) (0.053) (0.068) (0.076) (0.077) (0.092)
High school 0.727** 0.763*** 0.903*** 1.004** 0.863**
(0.293) (0.273) (0.342) (0.386) (0.413)
Some college 0.883*** 1.113*** 1.212*** 1.270*** 1.468***
(0.250) (0.249) (0.321) (0.337) (0.462)
College degree 1.346*** 1.156*** 1.233*** 1.271*** 1.291***
(0.356) (0.372) (0.367) (0.380) (0.365)
Age 25–44 1.116 1.185 1.351 2.500**
(0.807) (0.831) (0.877) (0.997)
Age 45–64 −1.414 −1.352 −1.512 0.003
(0.951) (1.037) (1.056) (1.256)
65+ 0.903* 0.928* 0.988* 1.191
(0.469) (0.500) (0.500) (0.729)
Blacks 0.062 0.038 0.076
(0.145) (0.152) (0.181)
Hispanics 0.066 0.018 0.225
(0.128) (0.145) (0.153)
Gini 0.271 0.254
(0.387) (0.370)
Midwest −0.033
(0.067)
North −0.071
(0.089)
South −0.080
(0.088)
West −0.124*
(0.067)
Constant −0.656 0.169 −1.339** −1.340* −1.522** −1.082
(0.479) (0.510) (0.666) (0.700) (0.705) (0.763)
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.427 0.487 0.477 0.473 0.486
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on the state level, in parentheses. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
10 N. Berggren, T. Nilsson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxbecomes more or less non-general or progressive. The more progressive the income taxes, the lower the tolerance.16 It may be
that part of the positive effect emerges from lower taxation levels – as mentioned, the change in EF2a is signiﬁcant when included
by itself but becomes insigniﬁcant when the changes in EF2b, EF2c and EF2d are included – perhaps indicating that lower taxes
may be beneﬁcial for tolerance, but only when carried out through reduced progressivity. This suggests a role for tolerance-
increasing market mechanisms, in line with our theoretical reasoning in Section 2.2.
Robust standard errors, clustered on the state level, in parentheses. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
The three measures Tolerance racists, Tolerance homosexuals and Tolerance atheists can be disaggregated into three “freedoms”:
to speak, to write and to teach. In order to further examine our baseline ﬁndings, we also run separate regressions using each of
these components as the dependent variable. The more detailed picture that emerges is largely consistent with the baseline story:
An increase in the willingness to let racists, atheists and homosexuals speak and keep books in libraries is positively related to
preceding increases in economic freedom, especially lower taxes. The same relationship holds for the willingness to let16 The General Social Survey contains the question ”Should the rich pay a larger share of taxes?”, and in 2008 about 61% replied that the rich should pay either a larger
or a much larger share. Is this a problem for the interpretation of our results, which suggests that less progressivity increases tolerance by reducing tensions stemming
from unequal treatment by the government in setting tax rates? We do not think so, because of respondent ignorance. First, Roberts et al. (1994: 165) report the fol-
lowing: ”Consistentwith surveys of the general public, a majority of the subjects indicated a preference for progressive taxation in response to abstract questions. How-
ever, consistent with results from social psychology and political science research, the subjects' preferences for progressive taxationwere signiﬁcantly different (lower)
in response to concrete questions. The observed preference reversal between progressive taxes in the abstract and ﬂat taxes (i.e., proportional to income) in concrete
situations is hypothesized to be associated with subjects' ignorance …”. On how framing affects replies to tax questions, see McCaffery and Baron (2004). Second,
Karadja et al. (2016) ﬁnd, linking survey replies to register data, that a vast majority of Swedes believe that they are poorer, relative to others, than they actually are.
An experiment reveals that when subjects are informed about their correct place in the income distribution, they demand less redistribution. We therefore consider
the General Social Survey replies compatible with our suggested interpretation of our regression results: It is one thing to answer in the abstract, it is another thing
how real-life attitudes form and change.
17 These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2
Economic freedom and tolerance towards racists, homosexuals, atheists and communists.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ΔTolerance
racists
ΔTolerance
racists
ΔTolerance
racists
ΔTolerance
homosexuals
ΔTolerance
homosexuals
ΔTolerance
homosexuals
ΔTolerance
atheists
ΔTolerance
atheists
ΔTolerance
atheists
ΔTolerance
communists
ΔTolerance
communists
ΔTolerance
communists
ΔEF 0.000 0.035 0.041 0.025 0.048** 0.048* 0.029 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.044* 0.075** 0.087***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.030) (0.028)
Controls As in column
(1) of Table 1
As in column
(5) of Table 1
As in column
(6) of Table 1
As in column
(1) of Table 1
As in column
(5) of Table 1
As in column
(6) of Table 1
As in column
(1) of Table 1
As in column
(5) of Table 1
As in column
(6) of Table 1
As in column
(1) of Table 1
As in column
(5) of Table 1
As in column
(6) of Table 1
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.456 0.463 0.380 0.552 0.551 0.334 0.569 0.567 0.366 0.504 0.531
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered on the state level, in parentheses. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1. For the full results, including all control variables, see Table OA1 in the Online appendix.
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Table 3
Areas of economic freedom and dimensions of tolerance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
ΔEF1 0.017 −0.006
(0.022) (0.034)
ΔEF2 0.035*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.012)
ΔEF3 0.026 −0.015
(0.033) (0.045)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
racists racists racists racists
ΔEF1 0.000 −0.060
(0.028) (0.049)
ΔEF2 0.024* 0.023
(0.014) (0.014)
ΔEF3 0.046 0.075
(0.040) (0.062)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
homosexuals homosexuals homosexuals homosexuals
ΔEF1 0.007 −0.007
(0.027) (0.039)
ΔEF2 0.031** 0.036***
(0.012) (0.012)
ΔEF3 0.009 −0.031
(0.042) (0.055)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
atheists atheists atheists atheists
ΔEF1 0.034 0.005
(0.029) (0.039)
ΔEF2 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.012) (0.013)
ΔEF3 0.047 −0.008
(0.040) (0.051)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
communists communists communists communists
ΔEF1 0.041 0.037
(0.037) (0.045)
ΔEF2 0.058*** 0.066***
(0.014) (0.015)
ΔEF3 0.025 −0.094
(0.045) (0.059)
Note: All regressions include all baseline controls and geographical dummy variables. Robust standard errors, clustered on the state level, in parentheses. ***
p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
12 N. Berggren, T. Nilsson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxhomosexuals and atheists teach college students, but not for having racists teaching a younger generation. A reduction in
government size also correlates positively and signiﬁcantly with an increase in tolerance towards atheists being college
teachers.174.2. Extended analysis
In order to further investigate the robustness of the main ﬁndings, we conduct several sensitivity analyses. The results are
for the most part included in the Online appendix.
First, we conduct an instrumental-variable (IV) analysis in order to see whether the inﬂuence from more economic freedom to
more tolerance can plausibly be seen as causal. We focus our analysis on the change in EF2b, which turned out to be the main
driving force behind the positive relationship, and make use of two instrumental variables. As our ﬁrst instrument we use the av-
erage change in economic freedom in neighboring states, where the time period is the same as for the corresponding measures of17 These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4
Variables of EF2 (takings and discriminatory taxation) and dimensions of tolerance.
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
ΔEF2a (ΔTotal tax revenue) 0.032* −0.011
(0.016) (0.021)
ΔEF2ba (ΔTop marginal income tax rate) 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.004)
ΔEF2c (ΔIndirect tax revenue) 0.025 0.011
(0.018) (0.021)
ΔEF2d (ΔSales tax) 0.030 0.033
(0.030) (0.030)
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
racists homosexuals atheists communists
ΔEF2a (ΔTotal tax revenue) −0.010 −0.025 −0.017 0.013
(0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033)
ΔEF2b (ΔTop marginal income tax rate) 0.004 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
ΔEF2c (ΔIndirect tax revenue) 0.044 −0.013 0.023 0.006
(0.028) (0.020) (0.025) (0.034)
ΔEF2d (ΔSales tax) 0.041 0.030 0.026 0.035
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.046)
Note: All regressions include all baseline controls and geographical dummy variables. Robust standard errors, clustered on the state level, in parentheses. *** p b
0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
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the state in question. (For example, Iowa has six neighboring states: Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Missouri, Illinois and
Wisconsin.) The idea behind this instrument is that it is plausible to think that economic policy in one state is affected by the pol-
icies of close states. Policymakers often look for good reform ideas, and policies that have been introduced and seemed to work
well in states that are relatively similar could be thought to have the potential to work well in the home state as well. Further-
more, we do not see any reason to expect a link from the changed economic policies of neighboring states on future tolerance
changes in the home state, since the effects of policies occur in the geographical locations where they have been instituted.
Our second instrument is the change in EF1 in the own state. The idea is that liberalizing reforms are related by either being com-
plements or substitutes. At times, such reforms go together, as part of major reform packages, but at other times, one reform may
be reason for policymakers to feel inclined to not liberalize or even reduce economic freedom in other areas. Moreover, as can be
seen in Table 3 this dimension of economic freedom is not associated with the change in tolerance. When performing an IV anal-
ysis, the results of which are reported in Table OA2 in the Online appendix, we ﬁrst of all ﬁnd that the instruments are signiﬁ-
cantly related to our explanatory variable of interest, change in EF2b. The 2SLS regressions then show that the baseline OLS
results seem to hold: Average change in tolerance, change in tolerance towards homosexuals, change in tolerance towards atheists
and change in tolerance towards communists all stand in a signiﬁcant relationship to change in the top marginal income tax rate
and the threshold to which it applies, which, together with results of Sargan tests, suggests causality – although we advise readers
to interpret this with some caution (as we cannot clearly show that the exclusion restriction is fulﬁlled). No such ﬁnding is ob-
tained for change in tolerance towards racists. As for the magnitude of the effects, the 2SLS estimations suggest that baseline re-
sults, if anything, are biased downwards. As a further sensitivity test, we conduct the IV analysis using only the ﬁrst instrument
above, and the results hold in the same manner (available on request).
Second, we have conducted a further tentative test of causality, of a Granger type, by regressing the change in economic
freedom on change in tolerance in the preceding six-year period (using our various measures). That is, we use the same
methodological approach as when studying how the change in economic freedom affects the change in tolerance, but we
make let the latter be the explanatory variable and the former the dependent variable instead. We ﬁnd that with one excep-
tion, the change in tolerance in the preceding time period is not related to the change in economic freedom in a statistically
signiﬁcant way. The exception is the change in tolerance towards communists, which in some speciﬁcations is negatively and
signiﬁcantly related to the change in economic freedom. But the overall picture is clear: The reverse relationship does not
seem to exist for most of the tolerance measures, which may be taken to indicate that we do not capture reverse causality
in our main speciﬁcations. See Tables OA3a,b in the Online appendix for details.
Third, one concern is that the identiﬁed association reﬂects underlying cultural change that has affected both the outcome var-
iable and our main explanatory variable, such that the relationship is spurious. For example, one can imagine that conservatism in
the United States comes with both a desire to increase economic freedom and intolerance, causing both to correlate. However, if
this were the explanation, we would expect a negative sign, not a positive sign. To check this potential explanation further, we
add “ideological” control variables (religiosity, two political measures – the share of votes in the presidential election for the Re-
publican candidate, and whether the governor in the state is a Democrat – and a dummy for whether there is a right to workPlease cite this article as: Berggren, N., Nilsson, T., Tolerance in the United States: Does economic freedom transform racial, reli-
gious, political..., European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.06.001
14 N. Berggren, T. Nilsson / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwithout being a member of a union, a proxy for right-wing ideology) in order to see if the results stand even if these cultural/
political variables are included (see Table A3 for variable information). The results are reported in Table OA4 in the Online appen-
dix. It turns out that a higher share of people regularly attending religious services does not signiﬁcantly correlate with changes in
tolerance. The two political variables are also insigniﬁcant throughout. Importantly, the inclusion of the religiosity variable and the
political measures do not have any qualitative effect on the economic freedom estimates in any of the baseline regressions except
one: The overall economic freedom variable loses its signiﬁcance when the Republican-president dummy is included. This is driv-
en by the (absence of an) effect on the change in tolerance towards racists; for the other two tolerance measures, the overall eco-
nomic freedom variable retains its signiﬁcance also when this dummy is included. Lastly, we include a dummy for state legislation
that guarantees a right to work without being a union member. As noted by Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2013), this measure is a
proxy for political ideology such that governors' ideological position is signiﬁcantly more right-wing in states with such legisla-
tion. The right-to-work dummy is never signiﬁcant in any of our speciﬁcations, and the inclusion of the variable does not change
our baseline ﬁndings. Hence, we consider it improbable that our general results are driven by some underlying political-
ideological factor that affects both changes in economic freedom and changes in tolerance.
Fourth, we re-run the above regressions using state- and time-ﬁxed effects corresponding to the 41 states and the four time
periods covered in the analysis (results can be found in Table A4 in the Appendix). Time dummies are not signiﬁcant, and includ-
ing state dummies does not change our main ﬁndings: Changes in EF2, speciﬁcally changes in the top marginal income tax rate,
are positively associated with more tolerance.
Fifth, we run a test for multicollinearity. Examining the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) suggests no incidence of it: Reassuringly,
all individual ﬁgures are below the critical value of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004).
Sixth, we conduct an outlier check and exclude tolerance and economic-freedom observations (all measures) that deviate
more than two standard deviations from the sample mean. This exercise reduces the sample by up to seven observations.
The results, reported in Table OA5 in the Online appendix, suggest that baseline ﬁndings are not driven by extreme values. Sim-
ilarly, our baseline ﬁndings are robust to the exclusion of New York. In addition, we have run robust regressions (available on re-
quest), with very similar estimates as in the OLS regressions, which provides a further indication that outliers are not driving the
results.
Seventh, we test if our results are driven by the choice of starting year or period choice. We see what happens when we de-
viate from the empirical approach presented above, where we use three six-year periods strictly, and rather allow six-year periods
to overlap. In other words, we keep the lagged structure with changes in economic freedom predating changes in tolerance in the
same way as above, but let t = 1989, 1990, …, 2002, 2003, which gives us a “moving” change in economic freedom and tolerance.
This strategy gives a sample of 258 observations, a substantial increase. The results (see Table OA6 in the Online appendix) are
very similar to our baseline ﬁndings, with economic freedom relating positively to tolerance towards homosexuals and atheists,
and with EF2 being the main driver.18
Eighth, we include unemployment as an explanatory variable. Following the discussion above, unfavorable conditions and high
unemployment could potentially generate societal tension and hostility. See Table AO7 in the Online appendix for details. As pre-
dicted the unemployment estimate is negative, but imprecisely estimated in all speciﬁcations. Heller and Stephenson (2014) ﬁnd
that economic freedom is associated with lower unemployment, but labor market conditions are apparently not a mediator in the
relationship with tolerance.
Ninth, we have included all explanatory variables at their average values in the preceding six-year period (the average over
the period t-6 to t) instead of using their initial values in each period. It might be that individual observations in the data are atyp-
ical, and in this manner, we can check whether the results hold when measuring our right-hand side variables for a longer period
of time. We ﬁnd they do (see Tables AO8a–e in the Online appendix).
Tenth, the EF3 measure may not be an ideal proxy for regulation, since it only covers the labor market and since it, even there,
looks at very few aspects. There is another measure of economic freedom in U.S. states (Ruger and Sorens, 2013), but unfortunate-
ly it does not contain a sufﬁcient amount of data points over time for us to be able to use it in our dynamic analysis. Not least, it
contains a more ﬁne-grained measure of regulation, which in the index we use is limited to a few aspects of the labor market. As
more data points become available, our analysis can be extended. Likewise, Campbell et al. (2010) propose regulatory expendi-
tures as a better measure of regulation than EF3, showing that it predicts income better. However, we have been unable to
ﬁnd sufﬁcient data for including it. What we have been able to do is to test the three EF3 variables separately, and to replace
EF3 with a measure of whether a state has a right-to-work law (Bjørnskov and Potrafke, 2013), but in neither case do we ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant relationship with our dependent variable.
Eleventh, since tolerance towards racists is viewed, by some, as different in character than the other tolerance measures, we
have constructed an alternative aggregate tolerance measure that excludes this particular type of tolerance while averaging the
remaining three. In re-estimating Table 1 using this measure, we are reassured in ﬁnding similar results: The size of the estimates
increase, and statistical signiﬁcance is retained. See Table AO9 in the Online appendix for details.
To conclude, we ﬁnd that the results hold up quite well to scrutiny: More economic freedom does seem able to foster
tolerance.18 The approach to gradually include sets of control variables into the speciﬁcation also reassures us that our results are not driven by a small sample size in relation to
the number of controls. As can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2, there are no cases where only the speciﬁcation including the full set of controls is signiﬁcant.
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There is an ongoing discussion, with old roots, about the nature of markets and governments and their wider social con-
sequences. This study is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to look at whether changes in the character of economic policy can bring
about more tolerance in America. More precisely, the question is whether lower government expenditures, lower and less
discriminatory taxation and more limited regulation of economic life – i.e., more economic freedom – contribute to more tol-
erant attitudes towards racists, homosexuals and atheists in the context of U.S. states.
Using survey-based measures of tolerance – the shares of people who tolerate racists, homosexuals and atheists to speak in
public, keep books in the library and teach college students – and the Economic Freedom of North America index – measuring
the size and type of government expenditures, taxation and regulation –we conduct an empirical analysis to see what the “net”
sign of the relationship is. An advantage of this within-country setting is that we effectively control for cultural and institutional
features that are identical across states and therebymore precisely estimate the effects of market-oriented policies. Our ﬁndings
indicate a positive relationship –more precisely, the share of the population who are tolerant tends to increase if economic free-
dom is increased through more general (i.e., less progressive) taxes (and possibly also if the total tax level is reduced). This
holds, on the whole, for tolerance towards homosexuals, communists and atheists, but not, in a robust way, for tolerance to-
wards racists. This is because changes in economic freedom are unrelated to a willingness to allow racists to teach college stu-
dents. The results are shown to be stable to different sensitivity tests regarding causality, model speciﬁcation, variable
speciﬁcation, period speciﬁcation and sample speciﬁcation. Looking at the estimates for the control variables, it is particularly
noteworthy that education is positively related to more tolerance.
Although tolerance on average increased in the United States over the past decades, there is quite a large variation across and
within states over time. Similarly, there are differences across the country when it comes to the development of economic free-
dom, and some states have only experienced marginal increases or even decreasing levels. Our ﬁndings suggest that a one-unit
change in economic freedom corresponds to about a six-percentage point change in overall tolerance. This effect size can be illus-
trated with the states Texas and Tennessee: If Texas had increased its economic freedom as much as Tennessee since the 1980s,
overall tolerance (ceteris paribus) would have been some eight percent higher.
The signiﬁcance of these results is that unlike what many probably would have expected, economic policy seems able to in-
ﬂuence a widely embraced social attitude, tolerance, through making taxes more general. If the government treats citizens
equally, this can send a signal that freedom of expression for all, even for (sometimes despised) minorities, is worthy of public
support.
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Appendix ATable A1
U.S. states included in the empirical analysis.
Alabama Kentucky Oklahoma
Alaska Louisiana Oregon
Arizona Maryland Pennsylvania
Arkansas Massachusetts South Carolina
California Michigan South Dakota
Colorado Minnesota Tennessee
Connecticut Mississippi Texas
Delaware Missouri Vermont
Florida Montana Virginia
Georgia New Jersey Washington
Iowa New York West Virginia
Illinois North Carolina Wisconsin
Indiana North Dakota Wyoming
Kansas Ohio
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Table A2
The economic freedom of North America (all-government) index.
Area 1 Size of government (EF1)
1a General consumption expenditures by government as a percentage of GDP
1b Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
1c Social security payments as a percentage of GDP
Area 2 Takings and discriminatory taxation (EF2)
2a Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
2b Top marginal income tax rate and the income threshold at which it applies
2c Indirect tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
2d Sales tax collected as a percentage of GDP
Area 3 Regulation (EF3)
3a Labor market freedom
3ai Minimum wage legislation
3aii Government employment as a percentage of total state employment
3aiii Union density
Note: Each area, and each of its components, is measured on a ten-point scale. An
area is the average of its constituent components. Source: Ashby et al. (2011).
Table A3
Descriptive statistics and data sources.
Variable Obs Mean Std dev. Min Max Source
ΔTolerance racists 101 0.011 0.136 −0.208 0.422 General Social Survey (2014)*
ΔTolerance homosexuals 101 0.051 0.138 −0.216 0.678 General Social Survey (2014)*
ΔTolerance atheists 101 0.043 0.142 −0.383 0.408 General Social Survey (2014)*
ΔTolerance communists 101 0.037 0.152 −0.296 0.509 General Social Survey (2014)*
ΔTolerance 101 0.033 0.114 −0.163 0.429 General Social Survey (2014)*
ΔEF (ΔEconomic freedom) 101 0.352 0.710 −0.700 1.700 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF1 (ΔSize of government) 101 0.008 0.490 −1.70 1.00 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF2 (ΔTakings and discriminatory taxation) 101 0.344 1.304 −1.80 2.40 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF3 (ΔRegulation) 101 0.710 0.565 −0.300 1.90 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF2a (ΔTotal tax revenue) 101 0.284 1.305 −1.543 1.439 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF2b (ΔTop marginal income tax rate) 101 1.101 4.753 −5.00 8.50 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF2c (ΔIndirect tax revenue) 101 −0.079 0.539 1.675 1.244 Ashby et al. (2011)*
ΔEF2d (ΔSales tax) 101 −0.005 0.276 −0.911 0.657 Ashby et al. (2011)*
Real GDP per capita 101 10.204 0.295 9.530 10.90 BEA (2013)
Less than high school education 101 0.182 0.067 0.071 0.364 CPS (2013)
High school 101 0.361 0.045 0.258 0.495 CPS (2013)
Some college 101 0.223 0.053 0.112 0.344 CPS (2013)
College degree 101 0.234 0.053 0.118 0.376 CPS (2013)
Younger than 25 101 0.360 0.021 0.317 0.415 U.S. Census (2010)
Age 25–44 101 0.308 0.019 0.271 0.357 U.S. Census (2010)
Age 45–64 101 0.208 0.021 0.170 0.247 U.S. Census (2010)
65+ 101 0.125 0.018 0.051 0.185 U.S. Census (2010)
Blacks 101 0.128 0.092 0.004 0.363 U.S. Census (2010)
Hispanics 101 0.066 0.077 0.006 0.332 U.S. Census (2010)
Gini 101 0.417 0.041 0.328 0.513 Voorheis (2014)
Religiosity 101 0.256 0.083 0.063 0.529 General Social Survey (2014)
Republican president 101 48.21 7.969 28.08 61.50 Shor and McCarty (2011)
Democratic governor 101 0.465 0.501 0 1 Shor and McCarty (2011)
Right to work 101 0.394 0.491 0 1 Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2013)
Unemployment 101 5.42 1.239 2.90 10.50 BLS (2010)
Alaska 101 0.019 0.099 0 1 U.S. Census (2010)
Midwest 101 0.238 0.428 0 1 U.S. Census (2010)
North 101 0.158 0.367 0 1 U.S. Census (2010)
South 101 0.436 0.498 0 1 U.S. Census (2010)
West 101 0.158 0.367 0 1 U.S. Census (2010)
Average ΔEF in neighboring states 101 0.207 0.674 −0.679 1.480 Ashby et al. (2011)*
Note: * indicates that a variable is based on own calculations. The economic freedom variables are based on the “all-government” version of the index.
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Table A4
Adding state- and time-ﬁxed effects.
ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance ΔTolerance
Tolerance −1.231*** −1.252*** −1.230*** −1.237***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.142) (0.157)
Real GDP per capita −0.300 −0.212 −0.133 −0.317
(0.242) (0.285) (0.210) (0.274)
High school 0.724 0.403 0.386 0.710
(0.775) (0.844) (0.720) (0.870)
Some college education 1.660* 0.825 1.803** 1.323
(0.856) (0.778) (0.750) (0.847)
College degree 0.682 −0.007 0.324 0.554
(0.795) (0.870) (0.638) (0.871)
Age 25–44 4.721 3.165 6.312** 3.757
(3.257) (2.637) (3.128) (3.081)
Age 45–64 4.658 4.586 3.949 5.006
(4.078) (3.659) (3.757) (4.232)
65+ 3.623 2.140 6.073 2.230
(3.825) (3.246) (4.110) (3.514)
Blacks −0.316 −1.552 0.172 −0.860
(2.063) (1.860) (1.956) (1.929)
Hispanics 0.509 0.036 0.445 0.349
(0.828) (0.767) (0.835) (0.766)
Gini 0.874 0.433 0.787 0.768
(0.680) (0.647) (0.599) (0.807)
ΔEF 0.046
(0.043)
ΔEF1 −0.030
(0.037)
ΔEF2 0.045*
(0.023)
ΔEF3 0.026
(0.061)
Constant −0.339 0.391 −2.569 0.507
(1.438) (1.881) (1.727) (1.585)
Observations 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.540 0.533 0.566 0.529
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.06.001.
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